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This paper discusses the role of legal scholarship (academic legal 
research) within the built environment. It examines its epistemological, 
methodological and cultural nature, as well as that of the prevailing 
paradigm within the built environment. It concludes that the normative 
character of legal scholarship creates communication difficulties with the 
wider research community and suggests that this may explain the low 
profile of built environment legal scholarship to date. It proposes practical 
solutions to overcome the methodological communication gap and to 
integrate legal scholarship more fully into the built environment research 
culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law teaching has always played a significant role in the vocational education of built 
environment professionals. Most professionally accredited degree programmes in 
these areas include undergraduate law modules and postgraduate programmes which 
address a range of introductory and specialist legal subject areas. These are managed 
and delivered by specialist academics located either within their universities’ law or 
built environment schools. Their particular expertise lies in the application of the law 
within the context of the built environment and they therefore operate at the interface of 
the two disciplinary communities. 
 
The interdisciplinary nature of this field (which we will describe as “built environment 
law”) is recognised as a particular strength within a teaching context but its 
practitioners have historically made little impact within the wider field of built 
environment research. Academic research in the built environment has developed 
rapidly in recent years and there are now thriving international built environment 
research communities within the other specialist fields of management, economics and, 
to a lesser extent, technology. 
 
Unfortunately these developments have not been matched by equivalent moves within 
built environment law. Despite their interdisciplinary focus, specialists in the law field 
are rarely to be found at international built environment conferences. The output of 
published academic legal research (generally described as legal scholarship) also 
remains low in comparison to that of the other specialist fields. 
 
This paper suggests that the low profile for legal scholarship within the built 
environment may be due to the epistemological character of the law subject discipline, 
and to related methodological and cultural differences between it and the mainstream 
built environment subject areas. It begins its analysis with an examination of the nature 
of legal scholarship before considering some of the epistemological, methodological 
and cultural features which set it apart from other forms of built environment research. 
The paper concludes by suggesting some practical means by which the differences 
can be overcome in order to facilitate a more active engagement by legal specialists in 
the built environment research community. 
 
NATURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
THE ARTHURS MODEL 
There is a dearth of theoretical literature on the nature of legal scholarship. This 
reflects the historic emphasis of the academic legal community which has traditionally 
been characterised by a lack of intellectualism (Cownie, 2004, p. 69) and what has 
been described as a “trade school mentality” (Kennedy, 1982, p. 591) to the study of 
law. Nevertheless, Arthurs (1983, pp. 63 - 71) proposed a useful taxonomy of legal 
research styles in his report on legal education and research in Canada. 
 
This has informed the analysis in this paper and is represented as a matrix in Figure 1. 
It will be seen that the vertical axis represents a distinction between pure research 
which is undertaken for a predominantly academic constituency, and applied work 
which generally serves the professional needs of practitioners and policy makers. 
However, the more interesting distinction is that between doctrinal and interdisciplinary 
research methodologies which is represented by the horizontal axis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Legal Research Styles (after Arthurs). 
 
 
DOCTRINAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
Doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation of legal doctrines through the 
analysis of legal rules. Within the common law jurisdictions, legal rules are to be found 
within statutes and cases (the sources of law) but it is important to appreciate that they 
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cannot, in themselves, provide a complete statement of the law in any given situation. 
This can only be ascertained by applying the relevant legal rules to the particular facts 
of the situation under consideration.   
 
Deciding on which rules to apply in a particular situation is made easier by the 
existence of legal doctrines (for example, the doctrine of consideration within the law of 
contract). These are systematic formulations of the law in particular contexts. They 
clarify ambiguities within rules, place them in a logical and coherent structure and 
describe their relationship to other rules. 
 
NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF DOCTRINAL RESEARCH 
Doctrinal legal research is concerned with the discovery and development of legal 
doctrines and its research questions take the form of asking “what is the law?” in 
particular contexts. At both an epistemological and methodological level, this differs 
from the questions asked by empirical investigations in most other areas of built 
environment research. 
 
This is perhaps most obvious in a comparison with research in the natural sciences, 
which typically seeks to explain natural phenomena through studying the causal 
relationships between variables. Epistemologically, this is clearly very different from the 
interpretive, qualitative analysis required by doctrinal research. Although the 
interpretive nature of the process bears a superficial resemblance to the verstehen 
tradition of the social sciences (Schwandt, 2000), there are actually fundamental 
epistemological differences between doctrinal analysis and all styles of scientific 
research. 
 
Scientific research, in both the natural and social sciences, relies on the collection of 
empirical data, either as a basis for its theories or as a means of testing them. In either 
case therefore, the validity of the research findings is determined by a process of 
empirical investigation. In contrast, the validity of doctrinal research findings is 
unaffected by the empirical world. 
 
Legal rules are normative in character as they dictate how individuals ought to behave. 
They make no attempt either to explain, predict, or even to understand human 
behaviour. Their sole function is to prescribe it. In short, doctrinal research is not 
therefore research about law at all. In asking “what is the law?” it takes an internal, 
participant-orientated epistemological approach to its object of study (Hart, 1994) and, 
for this reason, is sometimes described as research in law (Arthurs, 1983). 
 
The actual process of analysis by which doctrines are formulated owes more to the 
subjective, argument-based methodologies of the humanities than to the more 
detached, data-based analysis of the natural and social sciences. The normative 
character of the law means that the validity of doctrinal research must inevitably rest 
upon a consensus theory of truth, rather than on an appeal to an external reality. 
 
The underlying moral or theoretical basis for the consensus is a matter of considerable 
philosophical debate and must remain beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
for present purposes, this could probably best be summarised as being informed by 
prevailing policy demands but being driven by a search for internal coherence within 
the existing body of legal rules. 
 
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
In practice, even doctrinal analysis usually makes at least some reference to other 
matters as well as seeking answers that are consistent with the existing body of rules. 
For example, an uncertain or ambiguous legal ruling can often be more easily 
interpreted when viewed in its proper historical or social context, or when the 
interpreter has an adequate understanding of the industry or technology to which it 
relates. As the researcher begins to take these extraneous matters into account the 
enquiry begins to move leftwards along the horizontal axis in Figure 1, in the direction 
of interdisciplinary research. 
 
There comes a point, towards the left hand side of the matrix, when the epistemological 
nature of the research changes from that of internal enquiry into the meaning of the law, 
to that of external enquiry into the law as a social entity. This might involve, for example, 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular piece of legislation in achieving 
particular social goals, or an examination of the extent to which it is being complied 
with. 
 
In taking an external view of the law, each of these examples could be described as 
research about law rather than research in law. As one continues to move leftwards 
along the axis one encounters a greater willingness to embrace the epistemologies and 
methodologies of the social sciences. 
 
PURE AND APPLIED LEGAL RESEARCH 
Finally, let us return to the distinction between pure and applied legal research 
represented by the vertical axis in Figure 1. 
 
Within the context of interdisciplinary legal research the distinction, in one sense, 
simply represents that between pure academic knowledge about the operation of the 
law, and knowledge of the same kind which has been produced with a particular 
purpose in mind. That purpose will generally be to facilitate a future change, either in 
the law itself, or in the manner of its administration. Arthurs (1983) therefore describes 
the latter category of research as law reform research and distinguishes this from the 
production of pure knowledge, which he refers to as fundamental research. 
 
In fact, there is also a strong correlation between fundamental research and the 
willingness (indeed, the motivation) of researchers to question not simply the operation 
of law, but its underlying philosophical, moral, economic and political assumptions as 
well. Research of this nature takes many forms but would include the sociology of law 
as well as the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Law and Economics movements. 
Although there is no rigid division between the two categories, these forms of 
fundamental research can usefully be distinguished from socio-legal research 
(sometimes described as law in context) which is more accurately described as law 
reform research within Arthurs’ taxonomy. 
 
The applied form of doctrinal research is concerned with the systematic presentation 
and explanation of particular legal doctrines and is therefore referred to as the 
expository tradition in legal research. This form of scholarship has always been the 
dominant form of academic legal research (Card, 2002) and has an important role to 
play in the development of legal doctrines through the publication of conventional legal 
treatises and articles. 
 
When doctrinal research is undertaken in its pure form it is variously described as legal 
theory, jurisprudence, or legal philosophy. Although aspects of the present paper draw 
on conceptual research within this tradition, the other three categories of legal research 
will undoubtedly be of greater practical relevance in the context of research in the built 
environment. 
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
LAW AS A HUMANITIES DISCIPLINE 
The dominance of the expository doctrinal tradition in legal scholarship has already 
been noted. However, it is important to understand that this is not simply a single, 
isolated category of scholarship. Some element of doctrinal analysis will be found in all 
but the most radical forms of legal research. 
 
For example, although law reform research appears as a separate category within 
Figure 1, its practitioners emphasise the importance of traditional legal analysis within 
their work (Cownie, 2004, p. 55). Indeed, even within socio-legal studies, it was once 
suggested that social scientists are regarded as “intellectual sub-contractors” 
(Campbell and Wiles, 1976) who should be kept “on tap, not on top” (Willcock, 1974). 
Despite the growth of socio-legal research in recent years, concerns remain as to the 
extent to which lawyers have fully engaged with methodologies from beyond the 
familiar doctrinal stable (Witherspoon, 2002, p.1; Partington, 2002, p. 5; Salter, 2005, p. 
6). Doctrinal research therefore remains the defining characteristic of the law as an 
academic discipline. 
 
For the reasons already discussed, the normative character of doctrinal analysis places 
academic law at the ‘soft’ (arts and humanities) end of the familiar disciplinary 
spectrum. Using the well-known Biglan (1973) disciplinary model (see Figure 2), it can 
be seen that this makes the subject untypical of most other specialisms within the built 
environment research community. Although design falls to the right of law on the 
spectrum, perhaps significantly, this is also an area which has failed to develop a 
research presence within the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Disciplinary Model (after Biglan). 
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CONTRASTS WITH OTHER BUILT ENVIRONMENT DISCIPLINES 
The technology and engineering specialisms, of course, fall within the natural sciences.  
However, the built environment field’s more dominant specialisms of management and 
economics also operate within a scientific paradigm. Indeed the language of built 
environment research as a whole tends to be dominated by the rhetoric of the social 
sciences. This is characterised by a concern with the traditional social science 
methodologies and, in particular, with an emphasis on empirical investigation (see, for 
example, Fellows and Liu, 2002) at the expense of the development of theoretical 
perspectives by individual researchers (Betts and Lansley, 1993; Loosemore, 1997; 
Brandon 2002). 
 
The epistemological differences between (humanities-based) academic law and the 
majority of other (science-based) disciplines within built environment research are 
therefore significant. These reflect fundamental differences in attitudes to knowledge, 
and in the cognitive nature of the knowledge being studied in the different fields.  
 
Becher (1987) has described the humanities as being concerned with the organic 
development of knowledge through an ongoing process of reiterative enquiry which 
addresses multifaceted problems in order to develop a holistic understanding of their 
complexity. This might be seen as a fair representation of the expository tradition in 
legal scholarship. By way of contrast, he describes knowledge production in the 
sciences in terms of the cumulative and piecemeal accumulation of individual 
segments of knowledge which, over time, contribute to a comprehensive explanation of 
particular phenomena. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS 
 
THE METHODOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION GAP 
The underlying epistemological differences between legal scholarship and most other 
built environment research styles also generate methodological and cultural differences 
between the two. These produce expectations regarding the external appearance of 
academic research within the field which can often be quite alien to legal scholars. 
These may relate to expectations about the actual nature of research outputs, about 
the process which is undertaken in generating the research, or about the more general 
behavioural characteristics of researchers within the field. 
 
Most fundamentally, the academic merits of doctrinal work can often be something of a 
mystery to those who have not been inculcated into the thought conventions of legal 
analysis, typically through a prolonged period of legal education. As a consequence, 
peer review of legal work by non-legal specialists within the built environment field can 
often lead to difficulties. The legal scholar’s work can all too easily be dismissed as 
lacking a methodology, as being based only on opinion, or even as being “not 
research” by peers who have (typically) served their own apprenticeships within a 
social science research community. 
 
Becher’s (1981) account of how academic law is regarded by the rest of the academic 
community provides an indication of the communication gap which exists in this context. 
Academic lawyers were described by their colleagues as: “not really 
academic….arcane, distant and alien: an appendage to the academic 
world…vociferous, untrustworthy, immoral, narrow and arrogant”. Their work was seen 
as “….unexciting, uncreative, and comprising a series of intellectual puzzles scattered 
among large areas of description.” 
 
 
URBAN AND RURAL RESEARCH STYLES 
In their seminal work, Academic Tribes and Territories, Becher & Trowler (2001) have 
also demonstrated how individual academic communities (tribes) develop cultural 
norms which are closely associated with the particular knowledge areas (territories) 
which they inhabit. In particular, they demonstrate a close correlation between Biglan’s 
hard / soft continuum of knowledge types and a corresponding continuum between 
urban and rural research styles. Scientific research culture (including the prevailing 
culture within the built environment) conforms to an urban research pattern, whilst the 
humanities (including law) typically exhibit the characteristics of a rural research 
community. 
 
The concept of urban and rural styles reflects the different population densities (the 
“people to problem” ratio) of researchers in particular fields. Urban (predominantly 
scientific) research communities are characterised by a small number of research 
issues at any one time, all being pursued by a substantial number of researchers. In 
rural (predominantly humanities-based) communities, researchers have a virtually 
unlimited number of research areas to choose from. Hence a profusion of individual 
research specialisms tends to develop with small numbers of researchers developing 
long-term expertise in each of them. This latter model is, of course, characteristic of the 
legal specialist within a particular legal subject area. 
 
CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS 
The different methodological approaches within scientific and humanities-based 
subjects, and the corresponding urban and rural research styles produce a large range 
of further cultural phenomena which are explored in detail by Becher and Trowler 
(2001). 
 
They find, for example, that urban research communities focus on narrower and more 
short-term research topics, are more competitive and are more influenced by fashions 
and the availability of external funding than their rural counterparts. They also describe 
a greater tendency for urban areas to be dominated by charismatic research leaders 
(the so-called ‘research stars’) than urban areas. Urban research is faster moving and 
more gregarious than that within rural environments and is therefore characterised by 
more networks, a higher level of conference attendance and an increased incidence of 
team working than in rural settings. 
 
The different patterns of working are reflected in publication patterns and styles. Rural 
communities produce large numbers of short articles, often by multiple authors, whilst 
the outputs from rural communities are likely to be more substantial, less frequent, and 
authored by a single researcher. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The paper has shown that the normative process of doctrinal analysis is the defining 
characteristic of most legal scholarship. It has argued that this places it within the 
humanities tradition with corresponding methodologies and cultural norms. As the built 
environment research community operates within a scientific paradigm, it embraces 
different methodologies and cultural norms than those traditionally associated with 
legal scholarship. 
 
The paper has argued that the resulting communication difficulties and the consequent 
lack of understanding of legal scholarship may help to explain why it has so far failed to 
make a significant impact within the wider built environment research community. The 
proposed solutions are practical ones. They require an understanding, by all parties, 
that the built environment is an interdisciplinary field which draws on a wide range of 
epistemological, methodological and cultural academic traditions (Chynoweth, 2006). 
 
This inevitably calls for all built environment researchers to develop at least an 
awareness of the practices employed by disciplines within the field other than their own. 
It also demands a willingness to articulate their own methodological practices more 
fully within their own work so that these can be more fully understood by those from 
different disciplinary traditions. In the context of legal scholarship this means that some 
explanation should always be provided about the nature and purpose of doctrinal 
analysis if this is being employed in a particular research publication.  
 
The methodological communication gap can be narrowed but it can never be 
completely closed. Wherever possible it must therefore always be preferable for legal 
scholarship to be peer reviewed by others with relevant subject expertise. This can only 
occur if the built environment legal community is more research active, more coherent 
and more willing to develop its own distinctive identity within built environment research 
than has hitherto been the case. By coming forward and engaging in this way, legal 
specialists will be able to influence decisions and norms within the wider research 
community. 
 
Many of the cultural divisions are easily addressed. Although Becher and Trowler 
(2001) have shown that academic culture is related to disciplinary epistemology, it is 
not entirely dependent on it. To a great extent legal scholarship can therefore increase 
its visibility and influence within the wider community by simply adopting more of its 
established cultural norms. This might include more active engagement with research 
networks, an increased level of attendance at conferences and a greater willingness to 
collaborate with other researchers, whether from the legal specialism or from one of the 
related disciplines. In short, if legal scholars wish to be taken more seriously within the 
built environment research community, they have to become more gregarious. 
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